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Abstract
This paper explores the collective action problem as it relates to climate change and develops
two models that capture the mitigation/adaptation trade-oﬀ.T h eﬁrst model presents climate
change as a certain disaster, while the second models climate change as a stochastic event. A
one-shot public goods experiment with students reveals a relatively low rate of mitigation for
both models. The eﬀect of vulnerability towards climate change is also examined by varying
the magnitude of the disaster across treatments. Our results ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween the high and low-vulnerability environments. This research contributes to the literature
concerning public goods experiments as well as the analysis of climate change policy.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the past two decades, mitigation has been the primary focus of international climate change
conferences, with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and all subsequent
documents repeatedly calling on countries to cooperate in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (UN-
FCCC, 1992). This ‘narrow’ focus on mitigation has been criticised by some for failing to integrate
adaptation suﬃc i e n t l yi n t op o l i c y( B u r t o net al, 2007). However, the role of adaptation in address-
ing climate change is becoming more important. This is partly because of the cumulative eﬀect of
past emissions, such that there is a certain amount of climatic change to which we are committed,
and partly because the global conventions are not bringing about the necessary degree of mitigation.
Thus mitigation and adaptation are both essential in addressing climate change eﬀectively. How-
ever, ﬁnancial constraints apply and even when funds have been allocated towards ﬁghting climate
change, a decision on how best to allocate these resources must be made.
In this paper we use behavioural and experimental economics to study a particular aspect of
the economics of climate change: the potential trade-oﬀ between mitigation and adaptation. The
Earth’s atmosphere is a prime example of a global public good. By extension, mitigation eﬀorts in
reducing the concentration of greenhouse gases can be characterised as an investment in the public
good, since emissions from any location spread uniformly through the atmosphere. Investing in
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1adaptation measures, on the other hand, constitute a ‘private good’ investment, beneﬁting only the
country or the individual that invests in adaptation.
The social dilemma that societies face when dealing with public goods is that an action that is
rational for an individual country is not globally optimal. This is because each country faces the
private costs of abatement whilst the beneﬁts of such eﬀorts are shared by all, regardless of their
level contribution. There is thus a strong incentive to free-ride.
We use a one-shot public goods game framework with two adjustments. First, our experiment is
framed in terms of climate change, which implies that the public good does not generate a potential
gain, but rather that subjects face a loss in earnings1. The size of that loss is determined by the
types of investments made in preparing for climate change, i.e. mitigation or adaptation. Second,
the eﬀects of climate change are highly uncertain and there is therefore a risk of a climate disaster
independent of mitigation eﬀort. Our stochastic model reﬂects this risk by incorporating probabilistic
destruction into the design.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a background in understanding the terms
used in the context of climate change. In section 3 a review of the public good literature is given,
followed by a discussion of the core papers that inﬂuenced the design of our models. Section 4
analyses the theoretical models. Section 5 describes the design of the experiment and analyses the
results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Climate Change
Climate change is a complex science and its eﬀect on the human environment will be experienced in
multiple ways, from gradual changes to sudden disasters2. For the purpose of simplicity and clarity,
this paper models climate change as an event, namely a climate change-induced natural disaster.
This is justiﬁed since extreme weather events, such as ﬂoods, hurricanes, heat waves and droughts,
constitute some of the most direct and threatening risks of global warming (Stern, 2007).
2.2 Mitigation
The term ‘mitigation’ in the climate change vernacular refers speciﬁcally to approaches that reduce
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Mitigation can be achieved by using cleaner
technology or by reducing the demand for fossil fuels. It can also refer to enhancing greenhouse gas
sinks3. Quantifying the eﬀectiveness of mitigation schemes is relatively straightforward, as there is
a comparable unit of measurement, namely carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)4.
The eﬀect of mitigation on climate change can be understood in two ways and each is explored
separately in this paper. Firstly, by decreasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the at-
mosphere, mitigation has the eﬀect of reducing the severity of a climate change disaster. This
understanding frames climate change as a deterministic event where mitigation aﬀects the degree of
climate change but not the likelihood. This can be understood in general terms as well as in relation
t oas p e c i ﬁc event. For example, hurricanes are classiﬁe do nas c a l ef r o m1t o5 ,w i t h1r e p r e s e n t i n g
a minor storm. Climate change is likely to increase the intensity of such weather events so that a
1This illustrates the ﬁnding in the IPCC fourth Assessment Report (2007) that the majority of countries are
likely to experience a loss in wealth due to climate change and not a gain. Additionally, beyond certain increases in
temperature, global agricultural productivity is projected to decline.
2See the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) for a review of the implications of a warmer climate.
3Such as preventing deforestation as well as employing carbon capture and sequestration techniques.
4This measure expresses how much global warming a given type of greenhouse gas may cause, with carbon dioxide
as the reference gas.
2region that historically experienced ‘category 1’ hurricanes is likely to experience more severe ‘cat-
egory 4’ hurricanes. Mitigation eﬀort will thus lower the severity of such storms, for example to a
‘category 2’ level hurricane.
Alternatively, the eﬀect of mitigation can be understood to decrease the probability of experienc-
ing an extreme event. This approach analyses climate change as an endogenous event where humans
play a role in determining the likelihood of experiencing a climate change disaster. For example a
region may have historically experienced a ﬂood once in a hundred years but, with climate change
and no mitigation eﬀort, it could occur more frequently at a rate of one in ten years. Therefore,
mitigation will reduce the probability of such events.
In reality, it is most likely that mitigation measures will decrease both the severity as well as
the likelihood of a climate change disaster. However, this paper models these eﬀects separately,
since the purpose of this research is to understand and analyse the trade-oﬀ between mitigation and
adaptation as a social dilemma, and this is best achieved when mitigation has only one inﬂuence.
2.3 Adaptation
In contrast to mitigation, adaptation is complex to deﬁne and measure. In essence it denotes any
action taken to reduce the vulnerability of a human or natural system from the negative eﬀects of
climate change. Adaptation schemes can be pre-emptive, such as crop diversiﬁcation and infrastruc-
ture developments5. Alternatively, adaptation can refer to the improvement of emergency services
and insurance funds to deal with a disaster once it has happened (Midgley, 2008).
There is no uniform way to measure an investment in adaptation, nor is it clear how to quantify
a return to that investment that is comparable across schemes (Ziervogel, 2008). Finding a suitable
adaptation solution for a region is speciﬁc to a particular economy and ecosystem. It is thus diﬃcult
to quantify how eﬀective a particular strategy is in general terms. Furthermore, some types of climate
change impacts can be compensated for by means of adaptation, but many present challenges that
are too drastic to surmount. Thus, the eﬀectiveness of an adaptation technique is limited. Another
signiﬁcant problem in undertaking adaptation strategies is that there is a large degree of scientiﬁc
uncertainty regarding future weather patterns6. While certain adaptation strategies are indeed
eﬀective, when compared with mitigation, the return to an investment in adaptation is limited to a
speciﬁc area or interest group and weakened by inherent uncertainty.
2.4 Vulnerability
Vulnerability deﬁnes how severely a region will be impacted by climate change. It represents factors
such as the political and economic environment as well as the susceptibility to natural disasters.
The vulnerability factor can be used to express inequalities across countries since diﬀerent regions
will experience the eﬀects of global warming in diverse ways. It can also be used, as in this paper,
to indicate various scientiﬁc projections regarding the degree of severity of climate change. For
example, it has recently been shown that the growth rate in actual emissions has exceeded the worst-
case scenario forecast by earlier IPCC reports (UNEP, 2009). This has signiﬁcant implications for
all countries.
5Such as improving storm water drainage systems and building wave breakers.
6For example, although the temperature in the Western Cape is predicted to rise due to climate change, there
is no clear expectation regarding rainfall. This could result in either higher rainfall or a drought. The appropriate
adaptation strategy would not be the same in both of these cases (Midgley, 2008).
33 Literature Review
3.1 Public Good Experiments
Although climate change analysis is a growing area of economic research, it has been surprisingly
under-investigated within the sub-discipline of experimental economics. The notable exception is
in the area of permit trading7. There is, however, a vast experimental literature that aims to
understand the conditions that facilitate cooperation despite the rational incentive to free-ride, and
these studies oﬀer insights that are relevant in the context of climate change8.
The classic collective action experiment is the linear public goods game described as follows
(Ledyard, 1995; Sturm and Weimann, 2003; Ostrom, 2000): Each agent is endowed with a ﬁxed
asset and must choose how much to contribute towards the public good. All contributions are then
pooled together, multiplied by some factor and then divided equally amongst the group. The payoﬀ
structure reﬂe c t sap r i s o n e rd i l e m m at r a d e - o ﬀ, such that the dominant strategy for each agent is to
invest nothing in the public good since the marginal per capita return9 of investing in the public good
is always less than 1. However, a larger payoﬀ can be earned by everyone if all players contribute
their entire endowment to the public good.
Numerous lab experiments have established the importance of conditional cooperation, reci-
procity, communication, trust and the concern for one’s reputation in explaining the positive coop-
eration levels found in ﬁeld and laboratory experiments10. On the other hand, lab experiments have
also revealed that there are a variety of individual types, for example strict free-riders and strict
cooperators, and that many individuals play a particular strategy that is largely independent of the
experimental circumstances (Sturm and Weimann, 2003).
When the public good experiment is conducted in a discrete choice framework (as in this paper),
cooperation levels are generally found to be between 40% and 60% in the ﬁrst round of a repeated
game. (Maier-Rigaud and Apesteguia, 2003:5; Beckenkamp, Hennig-Schmidt and Maier-Rigaud,
2007:7). When the experiment is carried out as a one-shot game, cooperation rates tend to be lower,
for example, Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977:5) report average cooperation at 30% and Cooper
et al (1996:200) ﬁnd cooperation averaging 38%.
Only a few public goods experiments have been conducted in South Africa. Contribution levels
have ranged from about 47% in the ﬁrst round of a repeated game, carried out with rural communities
(Visser and Burns 2007:12), to approximately 33% in experiments with urban high-school students
(Hofmeyr, Burns and Visser, (2007:513) and Kocher, Martinsson and Visser, (2008:510). The latter
authors also found that stake size did not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on contribution levels (ibid:
511). Unfortunately our results cannot be compared directly with these South African studies, since
they were conducted in a continuous-choice framework.
3.2 The Design of our Model
The models presented in this paper are based on the public goods game as outlined above. They
diﬀer from the standard design in order to capture speciﬁc dynamics relevant to the climate change
context. Firstly, we explicitly express our model in terms of a loss environment which reﬂects the
circumstances of a climate change disaster. Furthermore, uncertainty and risk, which are pervasive
7See for example, Bohm and Carlen (2002); Cason (2003); Cramton and Kerr (2000) and Wråke et al.( 2008).
8Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, (2008) provide a well-researched overview of the contribution of behavioural
economics to the economics of climate change.
9The MPCR is measured by the ratio of the return to the public good relative to the private return, divided by
the number of participants.
10See for example Lave (1962); Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977); Selton and Stoeker (1986); and Cooper et al
(1996), Ostrom, (2000); Fehr and Gächter (2000); Bowles and Gintis, (2000). Gächter 2007; Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr (2001) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
4in the study of climate change, are dominant features in our models11. Uncertainty is present in
both the deterministic and stochastic models, since there is no way of assigning probabilities to the
strategy to be chosen by group members. In the stochastic model there is the added risk of a climate
change disaster.
Berger and Hershey (1994) address several issues that are pertinent to our study: They investigate
the eﬀect of loss avoidance and risk in a discrete choice public goods experiment by comparing the
rates of cooperation from a stochastic and a deterministic model respectively12. The cooperation
rate in the deterministic case averages 50% (1994:183), which is in line with other public good
experiments, suggesting that the loss environment does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect contributions. In the
stochastic experiment, however, the cooperation rate is signiﬁcantly lower at 15%. The stochastic
environment increases the prevalence of free-riding behaviour.
T h ec l i m a t ec h a n g ee n v i r o n m e n td i ﬀers in many ways from Berger and Hershey’s insurance
market. One important distinction is that in the context of climate change the loss is not shared
equally by all, but is experienced by individual countries and indeed by individual persons. Another
important diﬀerence is that in our stochastic model contributions to the public good lower the risk
of disaster for all players but do not eliminate the possibility of disaster altogether. Furthermore,
if a disaster occurs, the size of the loss is dependent on individual factors including the amount
privately invested in adaptation.
In our stochastic experiment we model an environment characterised by probabilistic destruction,
meaning that contributions towards mitigation lower the probability that a disaster will occur. The
stochastic model presented in this paper is very similar to that of Walker and Gardner (1992), who
investigated the consumption of common-pool resources. In their ﬁrst treatment, where any level of
consumption increased the probability of destruction, they found typical free-riding behaviour and
the resource was destroyed. In their second treatment they introduced a safe zone where low levels
of consumption would not threaten the resource. They found some evidence that consumption
behaviour was retained within the interval; however, in general the resource still tended towards
destruction. We do not incorporate a safe zone into our models which implies that even with total
mitigation by all group members there will still be some possibility for a disaster to occur. The lack
of a safe zone in our design is motivated by inherent environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, there
is already evidence that many of the Earth’s natural systems have been aﬀected by climate changes
(IPCC, 2007), thus humanity’s ‘safe zone’ has in fact elapsed.
The trade-oﬀ between mitigation and adaptation is well expressed in terms of the endogenous-
risk literature. An endogenous risk implies that an individual or policy maker can ‘inﬂuence the
likelihood that a state of nature will occur’ (Shogren, 1991:241). In a seminal paper by Ehrlich and
Becker (1972), the authors distinguish between two types of investments that can be undertaken by
an individual in preparation for some adverse event. ‘Self-insurance’ is an investment that reduces
t h es i z eo ft h el o s si ft h ee v e n tw e r et oo c c u r . I nt h ed e t e r m i n i s t i cm o d e lb o t ha d a p t a t i o na n d
mitigation are self-insurance measures. ‘Self-protection’ on the other hand is deﬁned as the eﬀort
taken to reduce the probability of an unwanted event, but does not aﬀe c tt h em a g n i t u d eo ft h el o s s
if the event occurs. This characterises the role of mitigation in the stochastic model since it reduces
the probability of a climate change disaster. The stochastic model in this paper can be viewed as
an extension of Ehrlich and Becker’s work, since climate change is portrayed as an endogenous risk
and the trade-oﬀ between self-insurance and self-protection is evident.
11Uncertainty refers to situations in which various outcomes of a particular choice are possible, but one does not
have the knowledge to assess the probability of each outcome. Risk applies to circumstances where the decision maker
knows all the possible outcomes and can assign a probability value to each outcome (Griﬃths and Wall, 2000).
12The context is the insurance market where loss control measures undertaken by the insured individuals can be
considered public goods.
54 Theoretical Analysis
This section presents two models that reﬂect the trade-oﬀ between mitigation and adaptation, and
analyses them using expected utility theory. While there are shortcomings to such normative theories
of choice13, expected utility theory provides the standard framework for analysing decisions involving
risk. Alternative decision strategies are then discussed at the end of this section.
The experimental paradigm is as follows: Individuals are randomly placed into groups of four and
are each given a sum of money, their ‘initial endowment’, as well as a budget to invest in addressing
climate change. Participants must choose whether to spend their budget on either mitigation or
adaptation. The experiment is designed so that the private rational incentive is to contribute nothing
to mitigation14.
Parameters:
E = Initial Endowment
B = Budget towards addressing climate change
n = group size
xi = Investment in Mitigation, xi ≤ B
ai = Investment in Adaption, ai = B − xi
B = xi + ai
m = Return to Mitigation
d = Return to adaptation
S = Severity of Disaster
P = Probability of Disaster
4.1 Design of the Deterministic Model
In the deterministic model the agents face a climate change disaster with certainty and both invest-
ment strategies will decrease the vulnerability of the country to a climate change disaster. Mitigation
lowers the impact of a disaster for everyone, whilst adaptation lowers the severity for that individual
alone. The payoﬀ for each agent is given by equation 1, which shows that the individual’s ﬁnal
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It is also inﬂuenced by the exogenous severity term (S) which
speciﬁes the vulnerability of a particular environment. A higher S denotes greater vulnerability and
al o w e rﬁnal payoﬀ.













4.2 Design of the Stochastic Model
In the stochastic model climate change is depicted as an endogenous risk. An investment in mitiga-
tion by any agent lowers the probability of a disaster for all, while adaptation lowers the severity of
disaster only for that individual. Whether a disaster occurs or not depends on two factors:
1. Mitigation eﬀort: If more people mitigate, the probability of a disaster is reduced.
2. Chance: Since there is always a possibility that a natural disaster can occur independent of
human involvement.
The public good character of mitigation is apparent, since the return from mitigation is largest
only if all players mitigate. Moreover the probability of a disaster is the same for all members of the
13See Shaw and Woodward (2007) for a discussion on the limitations of expected utility theory.
14The instructions for the experiments can be obtained on request from the authors.
6group regardless of their individual contributions, as shown in equation 2. The total investment in
mitigation by the group is divided by the total budget available to all players such that the more
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Equation 3 above shows the expected payoﬀ for each individual16.T h e ﬁrst term shows the
expected payoﬀ if there is a disaster and the second term shows the expected payoﬀ if there is no
disaster. If no disaster occurs then players keep their full initial endowment. If there is a disaster the
actual payoﬀ is similar to that for the deterministic model, where the size of the loss is a function
o ft h ea m o u n ti n v e s t e di na d a p t a t i o na sw e l la st h es e v e r i t yl e v e l .
4.3 Choice of Parameters
While the models can be analysed in both a continuous and a discrete-choice framework, in the
experiment the participants are faced with a binary choice between mitigation and adaptation17.
We thus analyse the models using a discrete prisoner dilemma framework.
Simple data trials using Excel show the sensitivity of the model to some of the parameters.
The initial endowment (E=100), budget (B=10), and severity term inﬂuence the absolute payoﬀ,
but do not aﬀect the relative structure of the game18. In our experiments the vulnerability term
is homogenous, aﬀecting the stake size without introducing inequality. In the low-vulnerability
environment S=0.8, thus subjects face a potential loss of 80% of their initial endowment. In the high-
vulnerability environment S=1.2, implying a more signiﬁcant loss that would have to be ﬁnanced
from the participation fee.
For a social dilemma to exist, the return to mitigation (m) and adaptation (d) must be such that
the constraint, as expressed in equation 4 below, is upheld19: The marginal per capita return to
mitigation with full cooperation (n*MPCRm) must be greater than the marginal per capita return
for one unit of adaptation (MPCRa), which in turn must be greater than the marginal per capita
return for one unit of mitigation (MPCRm)20.
n ∗ MPCRm >MPC R a >MPC R m (4)
By constraining m≤1 we ensure that even with total mitigation there will still be some chance
of a disaster. The parameters chosen for the experiment are m=0.7 and d=0.475 which fulﬁlt h e
public good constraint in equation 4, i.e.: 0.07 > 0.0475 > 0.0175.
Table 1 shows the payoﬀ charts for the abovementioned parameters21.I n e a c h o f t h e t a b l e s
the payoﬀs are shown for the column player as combination of their decision and the number of
other people in the group that choose to mitigate. ‘Adapt’ is the dominant strategy in all cases
and since it is a symmetrical game the resulting Nash equilibrium will be for all players to adapt.
15This setup is based on Walker and Gardner’s (1992) probabilistic destruction model. The structure is necessary
in order to get a probability value between 0 and 1, and also shows that the mitigation eﬀort is dissipated amongst
all players.
16Because it is uncertain whether a disaster occurs or not, it is necessary to express an individual’s earnings in
terms of their expected payoﬀ.
17The reason for this is explained in section 5 on the Experiment Design.
18The amount of the budget is actually inconsequential to the ﬁnal payoﬀs.
19Unfortunately, there is no data in the literature that provides quantitative ﬁgures for the return of an investment
to either mitigation or adaptation.
20Where MPCRm=m/(n*B) and the MPCRa = d/B.
21Actual payoﬀs are shown for the deterministic model and expected payoﬀs are shown for the stochastic model.
7Consequently society lands up at a Pareto-inferior outcome. The ‘social optimum’ position is that
of full mitigation, which has a larger expected payoﬀ than the Nash equilibrium.
The risk/return ratio calculates the potential loss from free-riding compared with the potential
gain from free-riding22. The risk/return ratios are 0.75 and 4.44, for the deterministic and stochastic
model respectively, and are constant across vulnerability levels. The ratios suggest that there is
more to lose by free-riding (i.e. adapting) in the circumstances of the stochastic model than in the
deterministic model. This could imply that more people would cooperate given the stochastic setup.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
It should be noted that the prisoner’s-dilemma framework does not hold for all values of m and
d(where m is the return to mitigation and d the return to adaptation). Table 2 below shows the
results of a rudimentary sensitivity test where m is held constant at 0.7 and d is varied. For the
stochastic model, the table shows that when the diﬀerence between m anddis roughly less than 30%
there is a strict prisoner’s-dilemma conﬂict. When the diﬀerence is greater than 50% there is no
social dilemma and it is in everyone’s best interest to mitigate. A weak social dilemma environment
exists between the two extremes such that if a certain number of players mitigate, one should also
mitigate. In the deterministic model the social dilemma holds over a much wider range of parameters.
5.1 Alternative Decision Strategies
Using the expected payoﬀ is a suitable means to solve the stochastic model as it accounts for the
likelihood of a disaster and the relevant payoﬀs thereof. The weakness of this method is that
it assumes individuals to be risk neutral in that they treat expected payoﬀs the same as certain
payoﬀs. In practice this assumption may not hold and individuals may use other decision rules. This
subsection highlights alternative decision-making criteria that are likely to be used by individuals
facing this dilemma.
Table 3 and 4 portray the decision environment in an alternative way to that of Table 123.T a b l e
3 shows the probability of disaster based on one’s chosen strategy24. Tables 4a and 4b show the
actual outcomes dependent on whether a disaster occurs or not and the strategy adopted.
A conservative decision-making criterion is the maxi-min principle where the individual selects
the best strategy given the worst-case scenario, i.e. in the event of a disaster (Griﬃths and Wall,
2000:125). Choosing to adapt is then the clear strategy of choice. In contrast, the maxi-max rule
is a more ‘adventurous’ approach (Perman et al 2003:460), where the individual identiﬁes the best
payoﬀ for each strategy and selects the option with the maximum payoﬀ. In this case the individual
would be indiﬀerent between mitigating and adapting, as both have a best-scenario payoﬀ of R100.
The above discussion demonstrates that the strategy to adapt is weakly dominant across a range
of decision-making criteria.
6T h e E x p e r i m e n t s
6.1 Guiding Questions
The models analysed in the previous section oﬀer a theoretical foundation that can be tested using
controlled lab experiments. While there are many interesting scenarios worth investigating, this
initial study is limited to three main questions:
22
23These tables essentially feed into the expected payoﬀ charts as shown in Table 1.
24It is worth noting that the probability values utilised in the experiment are large enough not to be subject to the
irregularities in behaviour often observed for low-probability hazards (McClelland, Schulze and Coursey, 1993).
81. Game theory predicts that the number of people choosing to mitigate will be zero. Do the
subjects in the experiments behave according to this expectation? If not, are the results in
accordance with other public good experiments?
2. The stochastic model diﬀers from the deterministic model in a number of ways, most notably
because of the added risk. This diﬀerence is expressed in the risk/return ratio from free-
riding, which is larger in the stochastic model (4.44, compared with 0.75 for the deterministic
model). This ratio suggests that the potential loss from adapting is substantially greater in
the stochastic setup. On the basis of this statistic we could expect more people to mitigate in
the stochastic model than in the deterministic model25. Do the results from the experiments
support this hypothesis? Moreover, do the experiments reveal any diﬀerence in behaviour
between the two models?
3. In a low-vulnerability environment the payoﬀs are larger than in the high-vulnerability envi-
ronment26. Because the relative payoﬀs are constant, the vulnerability factor should not make
ad i ﬀerence to the decision process. Do subjects in the experiment conform to theory or do
they act diﬀerently based on the vulnerability of their environment?
Four experimental treatments were conducted to address these questions27: two with the stochas-
tic model and two with the deterministic model, each with a high and low-vulnerability treatment.
6.2 Experiment Design
We decided to use a discrete-choice environment where participants could choose to either mitigate
or adapt. In this way it was easier to gauge preferences, as the participants did not have the option
of indecisiveness in splitting their budget between the two options. Furthermore, the binary setup
allowed the necessary information to be presented in a straightforward manner.
An important factor in analysing climate change is that decision making is to a large extent
characterised by irreversibility28. Such a decision-making context is depicted well in a one-shot
game, since global leaders make a decision today and the long-term outcome will be determined by
that decision29. Furthermore, we are foremost interested in understanding preferences which can
best be elicited through a one-shot game (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001).
When running the stochastic model, the decision was taken to present the participants with actual
payoﬀ tables instead of the expected payoﬀ tables30. This is because the expected payoﬀsc o u l db e
misleading, since such payoﬀs best represent a game with multiple rounds, where the average payoﬀ
is the expected payoﬀ.M o r e o v e r , t h e e x p e c t e d p a y o ﬀ table was deemed too confusing. This was
because students would not actually earn the amounts indicated, and secondly its use required a
more detailed explanation31.
By providing an external budget that needed to be entirely spent we were able to assess with some
precision the decision between mitigation and adaptation. This meant that the results could be more
clearly understood than in an environment where participants could choose to spend any amount
of their endowment on mitigation, adaptation or doing nothing. Importantly, both mitigation and
adaptation are decisions that reﬂect an understanding of the gravity of climate change and the will
to take action. ‘Doing nothing’ on the other hand cannot be interpreted in the same light and such
25This hypothesis opposes expected utility theory, which predicts no one will mitigate in either model.
26See Table 1 in section 4.
27The instructions and experiment protocol can be obtained from the authors.
28This is unlike some other environmental commons where there are multiple rounds and the stakeholders are able
to observe, learn and act based on the results of their previous decisions.
29Thanks to Prof G. Harrison for his insights on this matter.
30That is, Tables 3 and 4 were presented as opposed to Tables 1c and 1d.
31These concerns were validated in the focus groups.
9a strategy could be motivated by disbelief in the science, apathy, a high discount rate or free-riding
sentiments.
All the experiments were conducted as homogenous, symmetrical games, both in terms of the
initial endowment and vulnerability level. The instructions were ﬁrst explained in person with
the use of a white board. Following this, the z-tree software programme was utilised to run the
experiments (Fischbacher, 2007).
6.3 Subjects
The experiments were conducted with 144 students recruited from the University of Cape Town’s
general student body. The median age of the participants was 20 and 43% were female. Racially,
57% of the subjects classiﬁed themselves as ‘African’, 15% ‘White’, 12% ‘Coloured’, 8% ‘Indian’,
and 8% ‘Other’. Approximately 70% were South African citizens. The majority of participants had
taken at least one course in economics. The participants were given a show-up fee of R3032.
6.4 Experiment Results and Analysis
Table 7 summarises the results for each experiment and shows that the mitigation rate is statistically
signiﬁcant for each model and treatment. The null hypothesis of zero contribution to the public good
is thus rejected.
The two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test assesses whether there is a diﬀerence
between the various treatments: ﬁrstly between the deterministic and stochastic models and secondly
between the low and high-vulnerability treatments. The results, summarised in Table 8, indicate that
there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the mitigation rates between any of the treatments.
The questions posed at the beginning of this section can now be answered:
1. Subjects deviated from the game-theoretic prediction in all the experiments. On average
27% of participants chose to mitigate. This result is in accordance with most collective action
experiments that ﬁnd positive cooperation rates. When compared with other one-shot prisoner
dilemma games our results are similar, but less than the 30% found by Dawes, McTavish and
Shaklee (1977:5) and the 38% reported by Cooper et al (1996:200).
The relatively lower rate of cooperation could reﬂect a framing eﬀect, that adaptation was some-
times selected as the strategy of choice and not as the non-cooperative alternative to mitigation.
This would suggest that while most people selected adaptation because of the game-theoretic in-
centives, others chose to adapt because they deemed it the best way of addressing climate change.
This notion is supported by some of the reasons given by students for making the selection they
did33. Overall, however, the framing of the game is likely to have had a balanced eﬀect, since some
students probably chose mitigation because of a framing eﬀect too34.
It is diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀect of risk aversion from that of uncertainty aversion. However,
it appears that these attitudes inﬂuenced participants towards adaptation. Students repeatedly
expressed variations on the following sentiments: ‘I chose to adapt because it is less risky’ and ‘I
chose to adapt because it gives the best worst-case scenario outcome between the two options’. These
types of comments suggest that many participants used a maxi-min criterion in decision making.
The relatively low level of cooperation in our experiments thus reveals a tendency for caution in
decision making.
32This was necessarily high because in the deterministic model with high vulnerability, students could experience a
loss in earnings which needed to be funded from their show-up fee. The participation fee is comparable to the amount
students earn by tutoring at the University.
33For example: ‘(I chose to adapt because) I believe that a country should look after the needs of its citizens, and
undertake programmes that will beneﬁtt h e mﬁrst before any other population’.
34For example; ‘mitigation will start solving the problem whereas adaptation will keep us in the same predicament
each round’ and ‘Mitigation, I believe, is the most appropriate answer to climate change’.
102 While more people mitigated in the deterministic model compared with the stochastic model,
the results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other and do not support the premise that
people behave diﬀerently in the respective circumstances (see Table 8). The hypothesis that
more people may mitigate in the stochastic model because of the greater risk/return ratio from
free-riding, is also rejected.
It is not clear why the mitigation levels are so similar between the models. It may be that there
are multiple inﬂuences impacting on the decision-making process. For example in the stochastic
model, risk-aversion sentiments could have swayed participants in favour of adaptation, whilst the
risk/return ratio may have encouraged participants to mitigate. Alternatively, it may be that the
participants played according to their ‘personality types’ i.e. people who had a natural tendency
to cooperate would be more likely to contribute to the mitigation in both the deterministic and
stochastic environment.
3 There is no evidence that people behave diﬀerently given the level of vulnerability in their
environment. This supports the theoretical expectation that homogenous stake size has no
eﬀect on the level of contribution35. It also provides a basis for understanding the surprising
reality that the increasingly dire projections by scientists about the consequences of global
warming fail to inﬂuence policy makers towards greater action.
6.5 Caveat on the methodology of student lab experiments in studying
climate change
The premise for this research paper was to understand the collective action problem as it manifests
itself in the global context of climate change. The results from the experiments, however, portray
the decisions made by individuals and not countries. It is thus important to assess, ﬁrstly, whether
the macro-level collective action problem can be scaled down to an individual-level problem; and
conversely whether one can extrapolate from the experimental results for individuals to comment
on international climate change involving countries.
The macro framing of the climate change problem is clear since countries (as opposed to ﬁrms
or individuals) constitute the primary unit of decision making at global conferences. However,
individuals can also face a similar decision. To illustrate this point, consider the options available
to a farmer in addressing climate change. This individual could invest in technology that would
reduce his greenhouse gas emissions and would constitute a form of mitigation. Alternatively he
could invest in research and development to ﬁnd drought-resistant crops that would better prepare
him for a climate with lower rainfall, which would be a means of adaptation. Thus, while many
aspects of decision making certainly pertain to countries; there are areas where similar choices are
relevant to individuals.
Vulnerability can also be understood on both the macro and micro level. On the macro scale, a
country like Bangladesh, due to its geography, climate and economy, is more vulnerable to a climate
change disaster than a country like Canada. Similarly, on an individual level people face varying
degrees of vulnerability for diﬀerent reasons. For instance, an academic or a professional is likely to
be impacted signiﬁcantly less, or less directly, by climate change than a farmer would be.
The results of the experiments portray the decisions made by individuals acting in their own
interest. Just as an individual chooses a strategy they believe to be best, so too it is reasonable
to expect a country’s policymakers to decide on a course of action in the best interest of their
constituency. It is similarly reasonable to expect that policymakers are part of the group which they
represent and will therefore also be aﬀected by the implications of their decision. While recognising
the limitations of lab experiments, the behaviour of individuals that is revealed in the lab context
can be used as a basis for understanding and analysing certain dynamics on the global scale.
35This ﬁnding lends support to the study by Kocher, Martinsson and Visser (2008).
117 Discussion and Conclusion
By examining the trade-oﬀ between mitigation and adaptation, this paper has questioned why
the global collective action problem pertaining to climate change is so diﬃcult to overcome. The
analysis was restricted to mitigation and adaptation since both strategies indicate a willingness to
take action in addressing climate change. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that an important
factor contributing to the poor level of international cooperation is due to the public good nature
of mitigation. The results from the student experiments, while challenging the theoretical outcome,
still reveal lower rates of cooperation than would be expected. On average 27% of subjects chose to
mitigate and this rate of cooperation is relatively constant for both the stochastic and deterministic
models, as well as when the vulnerability level is adjusted. This suggests that the choice to invest
in adaptation is inﬂuenced by multiple forces. Firstly, there is non-cooperative behaviour typical of
public goods games that incentivise the individual to free-ride. Secondly mitigation is characterised
by risk and uncertainty and an aversion to support adaptation. Finally, adaptation is chosen by
some for its own merits as being the preferred means to address climate change.
The parameters chosen for this analysis capture the social dilemma clearly. However, as the sen-
sitivity analysis shows, with diﬀerent parameters the collective action problem may become weaker
or fall away entirely. Establishing the return to mitigation and adaptation with greater accuracy
may in fact demonstrate that it is in everyone’s public as well as private interest to mitigate. This
is an area for further investigation.
In addressing climate change eﬀectively, both mitigation and adaptation strategies need to be
considered and the correct combination will depend on the particular socio-economic and geographic
circumstances. While this paper has highlighted the public good nature of the trade-oﬀ, it has also
stressed that the decision to adapt should not be considered typical free-riding behaviour. Rather,
adaptation is an important component in tackling climate change, especially given the vulnerability
of certain regions and the uncertainty prevalent in the climate system.
With regards to policy, this analysis suggests that global funding initiatives towards addressing
climate change should take into consideration the collective action problem associated with miti-
gation. If countries take climate change seriously then they will be privately inclined to invest in
adaptation. In contrast, a country will need more encouragement to invest in mitigation, since the
beneﬁts are shared whilst the costs are borne by the individual country. Global funding can thus
play a role in addressing the imbalance in incentives.
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14Table 1. Payoff Tables by Model and Vulnerability Status. 
 
 
  Deterministic Model    Stochastic Model 
  (Actual Payoffs)    (Expected Payoffs) 
  Table 1a         Table1c      
        My Choice          My Choice 
Low 
Vulnerability 








05 8  3 4  
(S=0.8)  1 72  48    16 5  4 8  
  2 86  62    27 3  6 2  
  3 100  76    38 0  7 6  
                 
  Table 1b         Table 1d      
        My Choice          My Choice 
High 
Vulnerability 








03 7  1  
(S=1.2)  1 58  22    14 8  2 2  
  2 79  43    25 9  4 3  
  3 100  64    37 0  6 4  




Table 2: Sensitivity of the model to the parameters when m is held constant at 0.7. 
 
Deterministic model  Stochastic model  Comment 
0.18 < d < 0.7  0.37 < d < 0.7  Strict Prisoner Dilemma game 
-  0.2 < d < 0.37  Weak Prisoner Dilemma game 





Table 3: Probability of Disaster 
      My Choice   




0 100%  83%  
1 83%  65%  
2 65%  48%  
3 48%  30%  








Table 4: Summary of Possible Outcomes 
 
                Table 4a: Low Vulnerability S=0.8                 Table 4b: High Vulnerability S=1.2 
  Adapt  Mitigate 
No Disaster  100  100 
Disaster 58  20 
 
  Adapt  Mitigate 
No Disaster  100  100 





Table 5: Summary of Mitigation Rates by Experiment 
 
Model Vulnerability  Sample  Size  % of Participants 
Mitigating 
Average 
by Model  Overall Average 
    
Deterministic 
model 
Low  n=48 25%*
  28%*   High  n=32 31%*
 
   27%* 
Stochastic 
Model 
Low  n=32 28%* 
  26.5%*   
  High  n=32 25%*
 




Table 6: Results from the equality tests on unmatched data 
Between-subjects effects    z  Pr > z 
  
Modela   -0.125 0.9002 
  
Vulnerabilityb  Within deterministic model -0.609 0.5422 
Within stochastic model 0.281 0.7789 
  
a Model is deterministic or stochastic 
b Vulnerability is low or high 
 
 
 
16